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Abstract 
The finance of higher education faces a clash between technological advance, driving up the 
demand for skills, and fiscal constraints, given competing imperatives for public spending.  
Paying for universities is also immensely politically sensitive.  This paper sets out core 
lessons for financing higher education deriving from economic theory, including the 
desirability of loans with income-contingent repayments. Subsequent discussion includes a 
general strategy for OECD countries derived from the theoretical analysis, and reforms in 
England in 2006 which illustrate the strategy.  The paper concludes with discussion of the 
appropriate role of government in higher education. 
 
 
This paper discusses how to pay for teaching at universities.  It does not talk about research.    
 After initial discussion setting the broader context, subsequent sections discuss 
lessons from economic theory, a general strategy for OECD countries that derives from that 
theory, a major reform in England in 2006 which exemplifies the strategy, and remaining 
tasks in England (and the UK more broadly).  The paper concludes with discussion of the 
appropriate role of government in higher education. 
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1 The backdrop 
The world has changed.  It is still the case – and I hope always will be – that higher education 
matters because knowledge for its own sake is important.  But, in sharp contrast with 50 years 
ago, higher education now matters also for national economic performance and for individual 
life chances.  Technological advance has driven up the demand for skills.  To compete 
internationally, countries need mass high-quality higher education. 
 
 That immediately raises the question of how to pay for it and how to assist quality.  
Countries typically pursue three goals in higher education:  larger quantity, higher quality, 
and constant or falling public spending.  It is possible to achieve two but only at expense of 
the third.  Systems can be 
• Large and tax-financed, but with worries about quality (France, Germany, Italy); 
• High-quality and tax-financed, but small (the UK till 1989); 
• Large and good-quality, but fiscally expensive (Scandinavia). 
There is nothing illogical about the last option, but it is already unsustainable in most 
countries, where the only realistic way of achieving all three objectives is to supplement 
public finance with private finance.   
 
 In reflecting on these issues, two further points are noteworthy: 
• Competitive systems of higher education appear to produce higher quality, at least as 
measured by world rankings; 
• In South Korea the participation rate in tertiary education is 82 per cent; total 
spending on tertiary education is 2.6 per cent of GDP, double the average for the 
EU19 of 1.3 per cent; and private spending on tertiary education in South Korea is 
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significantly higher than total (public plus private) spending in any OECD country 
except the USA and Canada (OECD 2006, Table B2.1b, all figures for 2003).  
 
There is widespread agreement about two core objectives of higher education policy. 
• Strengthening quality and diversity, both for their own sake and for reasons of 
national economic performance 
• Improving access, again for both efficiency and equity reasons.   
 
2 Lessons from economic theory 
Good policy needs to be compatible with economic theory.  This section therefore seeks 
briefly to make three central propositions that should underpin reform in advanced 
countries.2
 
2.1 Competition is beneficial 
In most countries, higher education has, in essence, been centrally planned.  The case against 
this approach is not ideological, but rooted in the economics of information.  The core of the 
argument is that students (in sharp contrast with school children or people with complex 
medical problems) are well-informed, or potentially well-informed, consumers, and hence 
better able than planners to make choices which conform with their interests and those of the 
economy. Though that proposition is robust for many students, there is an important 
exception:  people from poorer backgrounds might not be fully-informed, with major 
implications for access, discussed below. 
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On the supply side, central planning, whether or not it was ever desirable, is no longer 
feasible. Technological change has led to more universities, more students, and much greater 
diversity of subject matter.  The myth that all universities are the same and should be funded 
equally is no longer credible.  In principle, differential funding could be implemented by an 
all-knowing central planner, but the problem is too complex for complete reliance on that 
mechanism:  mass higher education needs a funding method in which institutions can charge 
differential prices to reflect their different costs and objectives. 
 
In contrast with central planning, a competitive environment creates incentives for 
universities to be more responsive to demand from student and employers.  Such competition 
needs to be supported by an effective system of quality control. 
 
2.2 Graduates should contribute to the cost of their degree 
A second set of lessons concerns cost sharing.  Higher education creates benefits beyond 
those to the individual – benefits in terms of growth, the transmission of values, and the 
development of knowledge for its own sake.  All these justify continuing taxpayer subsidies.  
However, graduates also receive significant private benefits – in terms of higher earnings, 
more satisfying jobs and/or greater enjoyment of leisure – making it efficient and equitable 
that they bear some of the costs.  However, they should bear those costs when they can afford 
them – as graduates – not when they are students.  This leads to the third set of lessons. 
 
2.3 Well-designed student loans have core characteristics 
Loans should have income-contingent repayments, that is, repayments calculated as x per 
cent of the borrower’s subsequent earnings, collected alongside income tax.3  The efficiency 
argument for this form of repayment is that borrowing to finance investment in human capital 
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(in contrast with a home loan) offers no physical collateral.  For that reason and others 
borrowers face considerable uncertainty and, in consequence, would borrow an inefficiently 
small amount if the only loan on offer had conventional (fixed, monthly) repayments.  
Income-contingent repayments, by building in insurance against inability to repay, increase 
efficiency by protecting borrowers from excessive risk.  For the same reason, income-
contingent repayments also protect access.  And because repayments are collected alongside 
income tax, such loans also protect the lender from much of the risk of making an unsecured 
loan.  Note that what is being discussed is not a tax, which goes on forever, but a genuine 
loan, where repayments stop once principal plus interest have been repaid.  Income-
contingent repayments have a profound effect that is insufficiently understood. 
 
 A second feature of well-designed loans, is that the loan should be large enough to 
cover fees, and ideally also living costs, resolving student poverty and promoting access by 
making higher education free at the point of use.   
 
 Thirdly, loans should attract an interest rate broadly equal to the government’s cost of 
borrowing.  Many countries, including the United Kingdom, offer loans at a zero real interest 
rate, that is, there is a blanket interest subsidy.  The high cost and frequent bad targeting  of 
interest subsidies is shown internationally by Shen and Ziderman (2008).  In a system that has 
(a) income-contingent repayments and (b) forgiveness of any loan that has not been repaid 
after (say) 25 years, interest subsidies are particularly pernicious. 
• The subsidy is enormously expensive.  In the UK, close to one-third of all lending to 
students never comes back simply because of the interest subsidy.   
• Because of the resulting fiscal pressures, loans are too small, harming access.   
• The subsidies also crowd out university income, putting quality at risk.   
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• Finally, the subsidies are deeply regressive.  They do not help students (graduates 
make repayments, not students).  They help low-earning graduates only slightly:  
graduates with low monthly earnings are protected by income-contingent repayments, 
and those with low lifetime earnings by forgiveness after 25 years.  They do not help 
high-earning graduates early in their careers: with income-contingent loans, monthly 
repayments depend only on earnings;  interest rates only affect the duration of the 
loan.  Thus the major beneficiaries are successful professionals in mid career, whose 
loan repayments are switched off earlier because of the subsidy than would otherwise 
be the case.  A move to a somewhat higher interest rate would be progressive.4 
 
2.4 Why not tax finance? 
It is widely argued that a system of fees and loans will harm access, and hence that higher 
education should financed from taxation.  Despite its intuitive plausibility, this argument is 
mistaken.  Specifically, tax finance does not achieve the objectives at the start of the paper.5
 Taxpayer finance puts quality at risk.  It was possible to rely on taxation to finance a 
high-quality system when the system was small.  But there are limits to taxation, so that with 
a mass system, higher education will lose in the political battle to more urgent and politically 
salient public spending priorities, including nursery and school education, health care, and 
spending on pensions in the face of population ageing.  It is no accident that real funding per 
student declined sharply over the years in many countries as student numbers increased.  
Even if taxpayer finance on a sufficient scale were desirable, it is infeasible. 
 Nor does taxpayer finance widen participation.  To any social scientist who is serious 
about the evidence, one message about participation stands out starkly – it’s attainment, 
stupid.  In the UK in 2002 (before variable fees), 81 per cent of children from professional 
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backgrounds went to university; the comparable figure for children from manual backgrounds 
was 15 per cent6 – a shameful record.  Yet restricting the sample to young people with good 
high-school leaving grades, the figure was roughly 90 per cent for both groups (UK Office 
for National Statistics (2004, Figure 2.15).  Thus the major driver of participation is not 
whether or not higher education is ‘free’, but a person’s attainment in school. 
 Finally, taxpayer finance is regressive. University students are disproportionately 
from middle-class backgrounds.  If higher education is paid largely or wholly from taxation, 
the taxes of poorer people pay for the degrees of people whose parents tend to be better off, 
and who will themselves go on to be among the better off. 
 
3  A general strategy 
These lessons from economic theory suggest a general strategy potentially applicable to all 
OECD countries:  variable fees, well-designed loans, and active measures to promote access.7  
 
3.1 Variable fees 
Starting with efficiency arguments, universities are financed from a mix of taxation and 
tuition fees.  Each institution sets its fees, which for each student are covered by entitlement 
to a loan.  Fees give institutions more resources to improve quality and, through competition, 
help to improve the efficiency with which those resources are used.   
 
The argument for competition is rooted in the idea that students in higher education 
are broadly well-informed and that their information can be further improved.  But the 
argument is not for law-of-the jungle competition but for regulated markets, including a 
maximum level of fees.  There is good reason for a fees cap.  It needs to be high enough to 
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bring in extra resources and to strengthen competition, but low enough to maintain long-term 
political support for the funding strategy and to allow institutions less used to competition 
time to develop the necessary management capacity.  In addition, though universities 
compete in terms of teaching, some universities are also selling access to the student’s 
network of peers and, in this latter respect, have an element of monopoly power, creating a 
separate argument for some form of fees cap. 
 
Counterintuitively, variable fees are also fairer than other approaches; why should 
fees at a local institution be the same as one at an internationally renowned university?  
 
 The obvious argument against fees is that they deter students from poor backgrounds. 
That is true of upfront fees, i.e. fees that have to be paid at the start of each semester, but not 
where students go to university free and make a contribution only after they have graduated. 
This brings us to the second part of the strategy. 
 
3 2  A well-designed loan scheme 
Student support is through loans with income-contingent repayments.  The loan entitlement 
should be large enough to cover fees and living costs, and as discussed earlier, should carry 
an interest rate broadly equal to the government’s cost of borrowing. 
 
 If loans are large enough to cover fees, the package resembles ‘free’ higher education 
financed through taxation.  Students pay nothing at the time they go to university.  Part of the 
cost is paid through taxation and part through their subsequent income-contingent 
repayments.  The viewpoint from the Ministry of Finance is somewhat different.  Though 
loans bring in private resources in the longer-term, a loan system, by definition, has up-front 
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costs because it lends the money first and receives repayments later.  Thus, depending on a 
country’s fiscal situation, there can be advantages if students can borrow from private 
sources.  However, private lenders will typically charge a substantial risk premium unless 
there is a government guarantee;  and if there is a government guarantee, the loans will be 
classified as public spending.  Potential solutions exist in this highly technical area, but 
require considerable care in design.8
 
3.3 Action to promote access 
Assume that all students are well-informed and with a good school education. In that case, a 
good income-contingent loan is all that is needed. 
 
However, in most countries not all students are well-informed.  In particular, the 
group for whom we want to promote access is not well-informed.  More is needed.  Most 
people argue that what is needed is ‘free’ higher education, and that tuition fees will harm 
access.  As noted, however, the evidence points in a different direction – the main 
determinant of participation is attainment in school. 
 
 What does this imply for policy that really starts to improve participation?  Exclusion, 
it can be argued, has four roots:  lack of education, lack of information about university, lack 
of aspirations, and lack of money.  A well-designed strategy should address all four. 
 
Raising attainment:  access fails when someone leaves school at 16, usually for 
reasons that started much earlier.  More resources are needed earlier in the system, not least 
because of  the growing evidence (Feinstein 2003) that the roots of exclusion lie in early 
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childhood.  A central element in widening participation is to strengthen pre-university 
education, from nursery school onwards. 
 
Increasing information and raising aspirations: this is a woefully neglected area.  A 
series of policies address both.  Action to inform school children and raise their aspirations is 
critical.  Relevant activities include mentoring of schoolchildren by university students, visit 
days, Saturday schools, summer schools, winter schools, and the like.  
 
More money: policies include financial support to encourage teenagers to complete 
high school and grants and scholarships to cover some or all costs at university.  Both 
policies could be supported by financial incentives to universities to widen participation, and 
by extra resources to provide additional intellectual support at tertiary institutions for students 
from disadvantaged backgrounds.  In designing such policies, however, it is important to be 
clear that these are only palliative actions.  Scholarships, though important, are the tail;  it is 
attainment that is the dog. 
 
4 Reform in England 
England has seen a wave of reform over the past ten years. 
4.1 The 1998 reforms 
Reform in 1998 introduced income-contingent loans – the good news.  However, that apart, 
the system perpetuated all the faults of the previous system (for a detailed critique, see Barr 
and Crawford 1998; Barr 2002): 
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• Continued central planning in terms of price (i.e. fixed tuition fees set by 
government), quantity (i.e. central determination of student numbers), and quality 
(intrusive quality assurance). 
• Complexity: the system of finance was so complicated few people understood it.  
Complexity adds to administrative cost, and is also an impediment to access. 
• Inadequate student loans:  loans were too small to cover living costs, and there was no 
loan to cover tuition fees. 
• Loans charged a zero real interest rate, i.e. incorporated a blanket interest subsidy, 
with all the problems mentioned earlier. 
 
4.2 The 2006 reforms 
The failings of the old system manifested themselves in a funding crisis that was both 
predictable and predicted. 
‘On the lack of resources, the logic is distressingly compelling.  Public spending on 
higher education will not go up (the budget said so); parental contributions (i.e. 
private spending) will not go up (the Secretary of State said so); and loans to students 
(the other potential source of private spending) count in their entirety as public 
spending.  If public spending is unchanged and there is no extra private spending, 
there is nothing extra for higher education.... [A]s things stand, [the 1998 reforms] do 
not produce a brass farthing in the short run’ (Barr and Crawford, 1998, p. 78). 
 
 The 2004 Higher Education Act was designed to address the inadequacies of the 1998 
reforms.  Part of the package was variable fees.  But variable fees were politically contentious 
to the point that in the crucial Parliamentary vote in January 2004, the government’s majority 
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was reduced from 160 to five!  The Act, which took effect in 2006, had the following central 
elements, which broadly match the general strategy set out in the previous section. 
 Element 1: financing universities: the previous fixed fee of £1,000 per year, 
irrespective of university or subject was replaced by a variable fee, set by the university, with 
a maximum of £3,000 per year.  Thus universities are financed by a mix of taxpayer support 
and variable fees capped at £3,000.  As argued above, variable fees improve efficiency by 
bringing in more resources and, by strengthening competition, improve the effectiveness with 
which those extra resources are used.   
 
Variable fees are also fairer, not least because most students are from better off 
backgrounds (if I argued for subsidies for champagne to make it more affordable for poorer 
people I would rightly be shouted down as looking after my own interests under the pretence 
of widening access).  In addition, as noted, it is wrong to require a student at small local 
institution to pay the same fee as one at Oxford. 
 
 Element 2:  supporting students: students are entitled to a loan with income-
contingent repayments.  The loans were enlarged both to cover tuition charges (a missing 
element in the previous system) and to provide a more realistic amount to cover living costs.  
As a political necessity, however, the blanket interest subsidy was retained. 
 Element 3: action to widen participation restored tax-financed scholarships for 
students from poor backgrounds (which had been abolished in the 1998 reforms) and 
established an access regulator to scrutinise each university’s plans to widen participation.  In 
addition, other policies, separate from the 2004 legislation, offer support earlier in the system. 
• AimHigher encourages young people to think about the benefits of higher education, 
especially young people from families with no tradition of higher education. 
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• Education Maintenance Allowances offer income-tested financial support from 16-19 
to encourage people to stay in school. 
 
Many politicians and many commentators fail to realise how progressive the strategy 
is.  Variable fees introduce higher charges for those who can afford them (note that with 
income-contingent loans, ‘can afford’ refers to a person’s earnings as a graduate, not to 
family circumstances while a student);  and redistributive policies help poor people to pay 
those charges.  To an economist, these elements are staggeringly familiar: the first, a price 
increase, represents a movement along the demand curve. Taken alone, this element would 
harm access.  However (a) the fees are deferred, and (b), there are targeted transfers to groups 
for whom access is fragile.  This moves their demand curve outward.  Thus the strategy is 
deeply progressive.  It shifts resources from today’s best-off (who lose some of their fee 
subsidies) to today’s worst-off  (who receive a grant and benefit from AimHigher and 
Education Maintenance Allowances) and tomorrow’s worst-off (who, with income-
contingent repayments, do not repay their loan in full).  
 
4.3  Unfinished business  
A review of these arrangements, required by the 2004 Higher Education Act, is expected to 
begin in 2009. The review should address three areas, relating to each of the three elements 
above:  the fees cap, the interest subsidy, and policies to widen participation. 
 
The fees cap:  the reasons for a fees cap were set out above, and suggest that a fees 
cap has a continuing role.  However, the current level of £3,000 (a political compromise) is 
too low.  Almost all English universities charge the full £3,000, which thus approximates a 
flat fee.  A higher cap would bring in additional resources, would strengthen competition, and 
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would reduce the subsidy to the best off.  How high is a matter of balance.  Access warriors 
should not unduly perpetuate a mainly middle-class subsidy; market warriors should 
remember what happens when policy overshoots (the very high level of fees in the USA), or 
loses political support (New Zealand). 
 
The interest subsidy: the aim of the current blanket interest subsidy, widening 
participation, is commendable; and with conventional loans repayments the policy can make 
sense – an interest subsidy for first-time house buyers would help them by reducing monthly 
repayments.  In contrast, as discussed earlier, where a system has income-contingent 
repayments and forgiveness after (say) 25  years, interest subsidies do not improve access or 
promote any other desirable objective. 
 
 A zero real interest rate is the wrong one;  it is too low.  A commercial rate – the rate 
of interest on an unsecured individual loan, such as credit cards – is too high.  The interest 
rate that is efficient and equitable is broadly equal to the government’s cost of borrowing, for 
example, the rate of interest on government bonds. That is the appropriate interest rate for 
graduates with a solid earnings record.  However, there should be targeted interest subsidies, 
notably for people with low earnings. In addition, there is a strong case for phased 
forgiveness of loans for some public service workers, for instance teachers in the state school 
system (there have been moves in this direction in England for some subjects) and for nurses 
and perhaps also doctors in the national health service.  Similarly there could be a phased 
write-off for each year of caring activity. 
 
Policies to widen participation: economists, it is said, are obsessed by prices, while 
other social sciences argue that behaviour has more complex and wide-ranging causes.  Thus 
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I am sometimes bemused that it is these latter groups who become obsessed by fees (i.e. 
price), while an economist like me argues that the real causes of non-participation are more 
complex than fees and generally happen much earlier.  As already discussed, policies to 
widen participation should focus on ages 0-18 much more than on 18 onwards.  Thus 
AimHigher and Education Maintenance Allowances are very much steps in the right 
direction.  What is needed is more of the same. 
 
5 Conclusion:  What role for government? 
It is important to be clear that the arguments in this paper are not for free markets but for 
regulated markets.  Nor is anything I have said intended to be an attack on public funding of 
higher education, which should remain a permanent part of the landscape. 
 
The proposal is that universities set fees, but subject to a maximum established by 
government.  There is continued taxpayer support for teaching, probably in the form of block 
grants to universities;  the balance between fees and block grants determines the extent of 
competition.  Students apply to the institutions and courses of their choice. 
 
A well-designed system has a continuing important role for government: 
• To provide taxpayer support for higher education; 
• To regulate the system, both through a maximum level of fees and by ensuring that 
there is effective quality assurance (note that the role of government is to make sure 
that quality assurance happens, not necessarily to deliver the service itself); 
• To set incentives, e.g. larger subsidies for certain subjects; 
• To ensure that there is a good loan scheme; and 
• To adopt and encourage policies to widen participation.  
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 The idea, in sum, is that public funding is supplemented by private funding, but in 
such a way that higher education is free to the student – it is the graduate who makes 
repayments, but only in a way that is consistent with his or her future earnings. 
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1 Professor of Public Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London 
WC2A 2AE, UK: Tel: +44-20-7955-7482; Fax: +44-20-7955-7546; Email: N.Barr@lse.ac.uk;  
http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/nb. 
2 For fuller discussion, see Barr (2004a; 2004b, Ch. 14) 
3 The original argument was set out by Friedman 1955. 
4 The argument in the text is one of simple logic;  for the numbers, see Dearden, Fitzsimons, Goodman and 
Kaplan (2008). 
5 For further discussion of moral arguments about charging tuition fees, see Barr 2004a, pp. 266-7. 
6  UK Education and Skills Select Committee 2002, p. 19 
7 On international experience, see Barr 2004a, pp. 275-79.  On Australia, see Chapman and Ryan 2003. 
8 For fuller discussion, see Barr (2001, Ch. 14). 
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